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Invisible Management
S E N T - D A Y practices in the field
P ofR E corporate
organization and finance,

as evidenced by a number of reorganizations and refinancings during the past year,
recently have come under fire.
Professor W . Z . Ripley, of H a r v a r d
University, speaking not long ago before

the annual meeting of the Academy of
Political Science, took occasion to make a
vigorous attack on what he termed a tendency to "the alarming divorce of the
ownership of property, represented by
securities emitted by corporations or trustees, from any direct accountability
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whatsoever for its prudent and efficient
management." H e declared that the concentration of voting stock in new corporations in the hands of "banker-promoters,"
together with the ever widening diffusion
of non-voting stock among small investors,
was resulting in "the assumption of an
irresponsible control by intermediaries,"
and rendering helpless millions of these
small investors.
Professor Ripley's argument is as follows :
" . . . A l l kinds of private businesses
are being bought up by banking houses,
and new corporations are being substituted for the old in order that the purchase price (and more) may be recovered
by sale of shares to the general public..
But the significant change is that the new
stock thus sold is entirely bereft of any
voting power, except in case of actual or
impending bankruptcy.
General stockholders, to be sure, have always been inert, delegating most of their powers of
election, but at worst they might always
be stimulated to assert themselves. Under
the new style of corporation such general
stockholders are badly deprived of all
rights in this direction and new preferred
stocks are sold up to the hilt of the value
of the assets, if not beyond. T h e issues
are called preferred stocks. They are
really bonds. A n d instead, as formerly, of
being limited to a half or two-thirds of the
tangible assets, no limit is now set except
the powers of absorption of the investing
public.
" . . . There is no concealment about
it. Practically every prospectus concludes
by a statement that the business will continue to be managed by those who have
brought it to its present high pitch of
profitableness. But who, may we ask, has
given a hostage to fortune for honest and
economic management of the business?
T h e promoters stand to lose only the
amount of their stake—a minus quantity
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in dollars, leaving aside, of course, the
moral obligation. It is the public stockholders who stand to lose their all, in case
of misdirection. A n d most of them have
parted with any hope of participation in
future profits over and above their fixed
return, by agreement in the subscription
to forfeit all 'pre-emptive' rights in the
issue of new stock. H o w can there be
other than a whirlwind of abuse of power
under such conditions?"
Control over large corporations always
has tended to be vested in the hands of a
few. Small stockholders, by and large,
have no hand in the direction. They are
not desirous of exercising functions of
management, nor are they qualified to do
so. Their interest lies primarily in receiving dividends and in preserving the
safety of their investment and seeing its
value increase. Consequently, far less than
half of the capital stock in the hands of
a small concentrated group of holders may
constitute as effective an instrument of
control as an actual majority of shares.
It is true there have been rare instances
where small stockholders have pooled
their interests in a voting trust in sufficient
numbers to make their influence felt in
avenging a common grievance. The fact
remains, nevertheless, that the average
small stockholder is not interested directly
in the management of his company.
The present movement is a recognition
of the actual status of the small stockholder essentially as either an investor or
a speculator. Accordingly, he is issued
non-voting shares, and the voting power is
concentrated in the hands of those exercising the real control. There is this difference, however: the small stockholder,
being bereft of potential voting power, is
precluded from forming a combination
with others in his class to assert his rights
should occasion require. F o r the efficient
and safe management of the business he
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must rely upon the ability and integrity
of those in possession of the voting shares.
It is this situation which, according to
Professor Ripley's view, is resulting in an
abuse of power. H i s contention is that
while the non-voting shares, representing
the bulk of the actual ownership of the
corporation, are tending to wide distribution among the public, the voting shares,
representing the real control over the corporation, are tending to concentration in
the hands of "banker-promoters" who
paid nothing for them and who have no
financial interest in the company. Ownership is being divorced from management;
ergo, the result is an abuse of power.
"It is questioned whether Professor Ripley's statements are not too sweeping.
It is doubted whether there is such a pronounced trend toward separation between
ownership and management as he would
have us believe there is. Admitting the
concentration of voting stocks in the hands
of a few, it is nevertheless true that in
most of our large corporations those owning such stocks have also a large financial
interest in their respective companies.
It is true that a number of important
reorganizations and refinancings have been
promoted by bankers recently, in which
the bankers have emerged with the control
of the corporations in question. However,
it is by no means certain that this situation is resulting in the irresponsibility and
abuse which Professor Ripley decries.
The era of "fly-by-night" promoters has
passed. A n d , even though it is not claimed
that the millennium is at hand, and it is
recognized that there are black sheep in
every flock, nevertheless it is submitted
that the banking fraternity as a whole is
composed of able and upright men, who
are mindful of a sense of fiduciary accountability to the millions of investor-owners,
rather than giddy with a feeling of power.
Can the moral obligation be waved aside
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as nonchalantly as Professor Ripley has
disposed of it?
Aside from altruistic motives, these
bankers are selfishly interested in the enterprises which they promote. They have
a selfish interest in maintaining the property, for the sake of earning for themselves
future dividends on their stockholdings,
and for the sake of increasing the value
of their shares so that they later may be
disposed of at a profit. A n d beyond this,
it undeniably is to their interest to direct
the enterprises wisely in order to protect
their own reputation and assure themselves
future business. A disastrous adventure
would mean the destruction of public confidence in the bankers, with decidedly i l l
consequences to themselves.
Further, this control by bankers frequently has a salutary effect on those responsible for the active management of a
corporation. Obviously, bankers are interested in operating the business at a
profit. In a number of instances assumption of control by them has had the effect
of teaching the management how to conduct the business efficiently and profitably.
Building.

